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INTRODUCTION
Comparative ethics and the crucible of war
G. Scott Davis

Michael Howard takes the title of his recent essay, The Invention of Peace, from
the nineteenth-century jurist and historian of comparative law Henry Maine, who
wrote that "war appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modem invention."'
We modems tend to assume that the great wars of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries were aberrant eruptions marring the peaceful status quo, but the opposite
better describes the long view. Outside the Garden of Eden, human communities
have always been involved in political conflict and that conflict has regularly
escalated to the use of lethal force, both within the community and between communities. The ways in which peoples have both justified and constrained the use
of such force are windows into how they see themselves and the other peoples with
whom they share, often reluctantly, the world around them. To watch the changes
that develop in even a single society's understanding of war is to watch that society
being born and rebom. 2 To juxtapose different societies and their distinct ways
of understanding war, as Clifford Geertz once said of anthropology, is "not to
answer our deepest questions, but to make available to us answers that others,
guarding other sheep in other valleys, have given, and thus to include them in the
consultable record of what man has said."3 In this introduction I want to do three
things. First, I plan to sketch the ways in which the ancient Greeks and their legatees
discussed the restraint of war. Second, I will provide a sketch of contemporary just
war thinking. Finally, I want to make some suggestions about comparative ethics
and the restraint of war.

From Achilles to Jesus
The evidence of classical literature makes it seem like the ancient Greeks and
Romans were obsessed with political violence. Yet "despite the massive concern
with war in ancient historical writing," writes M. I. Finley, "it is significant that the
analysis of causation failed to progress much. The 'fruit', Momigliano wrote, that
Thucydides and his followers reaped 'is not very impressive' ... Roman historians
were not much better, nor were Plato and Aristotle in their theoretical reflections."4
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In large measure, Finley suggests, this results from "the 'naturalness' of warfare
both as a means of acquisition and as one way of achieving other objectives." 5 War
in the abstract stood in no more need of explanation than eating and drinking. The
shield Hephaestus forges for Achilles in Iliad XVIII depicts two cities. The first
might seem to be a city at peace, but that is only because there is a procedure for
adjudicating "the blood-price for a kinsman just murdered." 6 Such procedures are
always unstable and that first city may soon resemble the second, circled by "a
divided army gleaming in battle-gear, and two plans split their ranks, to plunder the
city or share the riches with its people. " 7 Power and glory are all that matter for real
heroes. The poem opens with Achilles disgraced and there is no sense that his initial
wrath is misplaced. It is his refusal to accept Agamemnon's gifts in book IX that
leads Patroclus to beg for Achilles' armor and thus seal both their fates. Sarpedon,
son of Zeus yet soon to die by Patroclus's hand, sums up the situation for his
companion Glaucus:
Ah my friend, if you and I could escape this fray and live forever, never a
trace of age, immortal, I would never fight on the front lines again or
command you to the field where men win fame. But now, as it is, the fates
of death await us, thousands poised to strike, and not a man alive can
flee them or escape- so in we go for attack! Give our enemy glory or win
it for ourselves. 8
Such is the fate of all warriors. The virtues of Homer's nobility are pride, strength,
and cunning. The proper exercise of those virtues results in riches and glory. Who
is the chief commander is a matter of fate. So is the length of a life. To be cut down
in battle is not something the warrior can always avoid, but as long as he fights
the good fight he has lived the good life.
Homer provides portraits of the despicable on both sides. Thersites is "insubordinate," the "ugliest man who ever came to Troy ... taunting the king with strings
of cutting insults" and when Odysseus has had enough he whacks him with the
speaker's scepter and Thersites "squatted low, cringing, stunned with pain, blinking like some idiot rubbing his tears off dumbly with a fist. Their morale was low
but the men laughed now."9 Even more revolting is the Trojan Dolon, whose fear
for his life leads him to betray his own people. Diomedes and Odysseus milk
him for as much information as they need, then, ')ust as Dolon reached up for his
chin to cling with a frantic hand and beg for life, Diomedes struck him square across
the neck- a flashing hack of the sword - both tendons snapped and the shrieking
head went tumbling in the dust." 10 Better to be Sarpedon dead than Dol on alive.
The moral world of Homer is one where commoners and their worries don't
count for much. If they misbehave, as do the women of Odysseus' house, they can
be disposed of without a second thought. 11 But before Odysseus returns to reclaim
his house and wife, and to dispatch the suitors and their sluts, he catalogs a set of
"alternative life styles," none of which is worthy of a warrior. It frequently surprises
students how little a role Odysseus' famous wanderings play in Homer's epic: four
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out of24 books; 75 pages in Fagles's translation, which runs to almost 500. In many
ways the Lotus-eaters are the scariest of all:
who had no notion of killing my companions, not at all, they simply gave
them the lotus to taste instead ... Any crewmen who ate the lotus, the
honey-sweet fruit, lost all desire to send a message back, much less return,
their only wish to linger there with the Lotus-eaters, grazing on lotus, all
memory of the journey home dissolved forever. 12
"Grazing" is the operative word here. Humans eat, drink, and tell tales; livestock
grazes. It is the hope of returning to genuinely human life that keeps him going.
From Homer to Thucydides we jump at least 300 years into an entirely different
moral world: no more superheroes and demi-gods. What prompts the Peloponnesian
War are fears about the balance ofpower. 13 But, as Yvon Garlan notes, the wars
of the Greeks and Romans, early and late, were hedged round with rules guaranteed
by the gods. "The ancients," he writes, "could not imagine a true war that was not
limited in time by declarations, agreements, and symbolic acts." 14 For Greeks and
Romans war displays a "sacral rhythm" which moves from the sacred precincts to
the councils of the people to a solemn declaration, all under the aegis of the gods.
Wars were interrupted "to observe a sacred truce during the great panhellenic
festivals." 15 Wars were ended by solemn oaths guaranteed by the gods. The political
order "was converted into a three-sided contract by the intervention of sacred
powers." 16
The laws of war were also guaranteed by the gods. Anything dedicated to them
was absolutely immune for attack. Not only the priests of the temples, but everything
"which belonged to the gods (sanctuaries, temples, altars, wealth, flocks and lands)
or fell under their protection (tombs, certain types of monuments, sometimes
even entire towns)" was out ofbounds, at least in theory; "men sometimes forgot
the terrible punishment meted out to Ajax by Athena for having brutally tom the
prophetess Cassandra from her Trojan temple." 17 Ambassadors, because they
were traditionally priests, were immune. Duty required that battle be followed
immediately by the burial of the dead. In early times, according to Garlan, trophies
were dedicated to the gods, though by the time of the Empire they had become
symbols of personal glory. 18
Such was the situation when the Romans became the lords of the Mediterranean.
Even at the time of Jesus the Romans, with their punctilious commitment to the
demands of law, couched war in ritual context. A generation or two ago it was
common to think that early Christianity "condemned warfare and military service
on grounds that were essentially 'pacifist. "' 19 Hunter surveys a number of volumes
that have changed the perspective on military service. John Helgeland's studies
of the Roman army suggest that Christians had been serving in the army since at
least the middle of the second century. 20 Origen's apology, while insisting that
Christians may not serve, explains this as a function not of a general Christian
pacifism, but of their religious vocation. "If Celsus wishes us to be generals," he
3
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writes, "let him realize that we do this ... Our prayers are made in secret in the mind
itself, and are sent up as from priests on behalf of the people in our country."21
Ambrose and Augustine, writing after the conversion of the emperors, theologically ratify a situation that had been uncertain since the persecutions under
Diocletian in the late third and early fourth centuries. In letter 189 to Boniface,
military governor of Numidia, Augustine exhorts him not to "think that no one
who serves as a soldier, using arms for warfare, can be acceptable to God." 22
Augustine goes on to enumerate the devout soldiers of the New Testament and to
explain that Christian soldiers "don't seek peace in order to stir up war; no- war is
waged in order to obtain peace." Furthermore, "it ought to be necessity, and not
your will, that destroys an enemy who is fighting you. And just as you use force
against the rebel or opponent, so you ought now to use mercy towards the defeated
and the captive."23 Augustine had elaborated his view of war as a tragic necessity,
inevitable given human sinfulness, in his Contra Faustum of 398. A few years
before his death, in the famous book XIX of his City ofGod, he repeats it. The real
evils of war are the vices that motivate human beings to anti-social behavior.
All that the soldier can do is serve in good conscience, abjuring hate and blood lust,
to subdue disturbers of the peace and preserve the fragile order that is all we can
manage in our earthly pilgrimage. 24 Charlemagne had the works of Augustine read
to him at meals. 25

The Christian church on peace and war, 975-1274
The legacy of late antiquity and the Patristic age, with regard to war as with so
much else, was deeply ambiguous. Priests and monks were themselves understood
in military terms. As Richard Southern puts it:
The monks fought battles quite as real, and more important, than the battles
of the natural world; they fought to cleanse the land from supernatural
enemies. To say that they prayed for the well-being of the king and kingdom is to put the matter altogether too feebly. They fought as a disciplined
elite, and the safety of the kingdom depended on their efforts. 26
The year 975 is generally taken to mark the opening of the "peace of God" movement in tenth-century France. In part this seems to have been a practical movement
to bring sanctions against robbers and thieves who plundered both the church and
the common people. At the same time, it was an early step in the emerging reform
movement, attempting to establish at least the basic parameters within which
citizens of the earthly city could pursue their vocation as "sons of peace."27
The peace of God movement led directly into the "truce of God," which attempted
to legislate those days of the week and year during which force of any kind could
be employed. Here also, vows were made in public assembly, in the presence of
relics of the saints, thereby invoking divine authority and sanction against all who
might threaten the truce. There seems to have been widespread popular support for
the notion that God and the saints would stand up for the weak against the predations
4
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of the strong. The social consequence of the peace, however, was to protect church
land and to place the lesser nobles directly under the authority of the greater. It is
not impossible that the result was greater peace, in the sense of order, but this came
at the expense of the freedom of the common people. 28
On 27 November 1095, at Clermont, Pope Urban II exhorted those who had
broken the peace to become soldiers of Christ, pledged to retake the Holy Land
from the Turks. 29 The various local peaces were extended throughout France,
whence the leadership was expected to come, and bands of pilgrim soldiers for
God began to move east in the spring of 1096. It is unlikely that there was anything
like a theory of crusading at the end of the eleventh century. After the crusaders
managed to capture Jerusalem, in July of 1099, many tried to explain, and thereby
justify, the success of the First Crusade. The available paradigms for war in the
service of God were those of the Hebrew Bible. The crusaders were like the children
of Israel, led out of Egypt to establish a holy kingdom and to rid the land of the
enemies of God. But unlike the ancient Israelites, the followers of Christ had a duty
to protect the land where he died for their salvation, in particular to place the Holy
Sepulcher in Jerusalem firmly in the hands of Christ's followers.
The distinction between just war and holy war, of which the crusade is supposedly
the prime example, is more trouble than it was ever worth. 30 Wars of self-defense,
or to recover property, were clearly just. Wars of expansion and enrichment were
suspect, though their ends might make them more credible and an upright authority
might guarantee their character. To be authorized and guided by God, as the
early interpreters of the crusades held those enterprises to be, could not be anything but just. But whether there could be such a war in a post-biblical epoch was
another matter. "To Anselm, or to Peter Damian," writes Richard Southern, "the
crusade made no appeal." He goes on to cite Anselm's exhortation to "abandon
that Jerusalem that is now not a vision of peace but tribulation." 31 But the
contemporary Song ofRoland portrayed upright churchmen winning personal glory
in the fight against the heathens. Clergy carrying arms was dubiously legal, though
some did. 32 In any event, the clergy on crusade thought their enterprise a just
one and prayed God for its success and the success of the various lords they served.
This was generally not thought in any way in tension with the demands of Christian
vocation.
Since the land was, so to speak, bought and paid for with the blood of the
Redeemer, the crusade differed from the wars of the biblical Judges in being
a reassertion of divine right. Mere possession did not constitute a legitimate holding,
despite the long hiatus between Muslim control and the mounting of the crusade.
The crusaders's goal was liberation, not only of the Holy Sepulcher, but of those
Christians, pilgrims and natives, who had been abused by unbelievers. From the
French perspective, the First Crusade stood in the tradition ofjustice derived from
the Roman tradition and the writings of the Latin fathers, notably Augustine. 33
Criticism of the crusades emerged particularly in the wake of the failed Second
Crusade, preached by St. Bernard in 1146. But such criticism as there was seems
rarely to have been directed against the idea of war itself. Individual failures might
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be seen as trials sent from God or as punishments for sin. 34 This was the judgment
of Bernard himself and became the standard response to setback in the subsequent
centuries. Later criticism was directed against particular crusaders or clerics who
abused their power for personal gain, but here again, few seemed to impugn the
idea. 35
In March of 1272, Pope Gregory X called a council at Lyons for May of 1274.
He solicited briefs on three issues: the prospects for a renewed crusade, relations
with the Greek church, and the need for church reform. Humbert of Romans, past
master general of the Dominicans, responded with his Opera Tripartitum. 36 For
Humbert, most of the reasons given for rejecting a crusade stem from sinful selfindulgence or unbelief. Arguments that the crusade is not compatible with Christian
peacefulness he meets with what had become standard responses. The Muslims
are actively persecuting Christians, some of whom convert to avoid mishap. The
land really belongs to Christ and his followers, from whom it was unjustly taken
six hundred years earlier. Thus genuine knights of Christ should welcome the
opportunity to enter into battle, not only for the sake of Christ, but to accumulate
the divine blessing that will open the way to paradise. Not only that, but a Christian
defeat of the Muslims might hurry them on the way to conversion, demonstrating
that there is no aid to be found in Muhammad. Thus war would be an act of charity
directed toward non-believers. Should the crusader be enriched by the way, that
was no harm. 37

Thomas Aquinas and the just war tradition
All the advocates of crusade, whether it was crusade to the east or against European
heretics, perceived the endeavor as just. What we call the just war tradition is
an attempt to clarify the conditions which must be met for a war to be fought in good
conscience. What makes the achievement of Aquinas so impressive is that his
account of war and the use of force generally is informed by a systematic moral
psychology and account of the virtues based on the work of Aristotle.
Thomas's older contemporaries tended to rely more on the traditional Augustinian
arguments. For Thomas, the human being is born into a social context and dependent
on that local community for being trained up into the practical and intellectual
virtues. If the individual is lucky enough to be born into a Christian community, the
cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance, courage, and justice will be informed
by the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. The human act moves from
the excitation of the appetites by physical stimulus, to the contemplation of an
action. If the act in question meets the conditions of virtue, then the inner act of will
initiates the outward action in pursuit of the good in question. That external forces
or limits may frustrate the act is sometimes fortunate and sometimes tragic, but our
judgment of the individual depends on the kinds of acts he or she characteristically
wills and pursues. 38
This general account becomes specific in the second part of the second part
of Thomas's Summa Theologiae, which discusses the details of Christian life in
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terms of the theological and cardinal virtues. The account of war comes in the
discussion of charity, specifically of those vices that are contrary to charity. 39 Hatred,
apathy, and envy may each, in its way, subvert charity. When concern for self
leads to the neglect ofthe neighbor's good you have discord, and discord gives rise
to contentiousness. As sides form there is the prospect of schism, a specific form
of prideful contentiousness that puts the spiritual well-being of the community in
jeopardy. This leads to the possibility of war.
When Thomas turns to war he presupposes the larger moral theory already laid
out, so when he says that war can, in theory, be just he means that it is the sort
of action that can be praiseworthy when, to paraphrase Aristotle, it is undertaken
by the right people, for the right reasons, and in the right way. This doesn't mean
that war is desirable in itself, which would be absurd, or that any war always
manages to meet the conditions of justice. In fact, given the perverseness of the
fallen human will, it is reasonable to assume that even a war that was in principle
just would be fraught with instances of self-serving and vice. The crusader chronicles are awash in murderous bloodletting, not least the accounts of the sack
of Constantinople in 1204. Aquinas is not denying or making light of these facts.
He is, rather, asking whether and under what conditions sinful humanity can resort
to armed force.
The answer is that resort to force is just when it meets three conditions. First, war
can only be undertaken as a public act, under the aegis of whatever public authority
is duly constituted to provide for the common good. Private use of organized force
is always illicit. Mob violence, vigilante "justice," feuds, and the like are inherently
vicious and could, in any event, not properly be called war. As always, of course,
there are likely to be grey areas, a fact that would have been most clear to medieval
people. So, while there might be no properly constituted authority with the power
to raise an army, invasion by Viking or Mongol might lead to the spontaneous
formation of a militia, a perfectly legitimate move to protect the common good at
short notice.
There must, furthermore, be a just cause to enter into war. Thomas explicates this
as "those who are attacked are attacked because they deserve it on account of some
wrong they have done." This admits of two interpretations, only one of which is
consonant with Aquinas's account of political authority. On the one hand, it might
appear that anyone who commits a malicious act subjects himself to correction.
This would seem to lay a foundation for crusading, given the view that the Muslims
ofthe Holy Land wrested the territory from its previous, Christian, rulers by force.
Such a view would seem to be justified when Thomas quotes Augustine's description of "a just war as one that avenges wrongs, that is, when a nation or state has
to be punished either for refusing to make amends for outrages done by its subjects,
or to restore what it has seized injuriously." Not only that, but Thomas has earlier
written, seemingly with approval, that Christians wage war with unbelievers to
prevent them from hindering the practice of the faith. 40
On the other hand, the authority of the ruler derives from human law. The purpose
oflaw is to constrain the wayward and disorderly, essentially a supplement to the
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education that the more virtuous received from their parents. 41 This constraint
extends only to external acts that threaten the peace and public order. Unlike the
natural law, the laws of particular human communities, indeed the communities
themselves, are fleeting and changeable. Their authority extends primarily to the
acts of their citizens and only secondarily to events removed in time and place.
Thus, without saying so directly, Thomas rejects both the original exhortation to
crusade put forward by Urban II and the reassertion of those justifications by his
brother Humbert.
The third condition for a just war, that "the right intention of those waging war
is required, that is, they must intend to promote the good and to avoid evil,"42 raises
the barrier still higher. Not only must the wrong be one directed at a particular
human community, over which the proponent of war has jurisdiction, but the
enterprise must be directed toward rectifying a particular evil, without employing any wicked means. Thomas's justification of crusading, then, only extends
to those Christians who are themselves being oppressed for the practice or preaching
of their faith.
In context, this was no negligible constraint. There had, through the eleventh
century, been a steady stream of pilgrims from Europe to Jerusalem, which flow
was only in part curtailed by the crusades. The indigenous Christian communities
of the eastern Mediterranean had suffered little at Muslim hands, even after the
onset of the crusades. In fact, in the decades just before the arrival of the crusaders,
the non-orthodox Christians of Anatolia had backed the emerging Seljuk Turks
as a welcome relief from the oppression of the Byzantines. 43 In 1229 the aspiring emperor Frederick II negotiated a truce with the sultan, guaranteeing Christian
freedom of worship throughout Syria, for which he was roundly excoriated by
the Christian patriarch of Jerusalem. After the Mongol conquest of Baghdad in
1258 the Christians were in better shape than the Sunni Muslims, owing to the
fact that the new ruler's wife was a Nestorian Christian. Another Dominican
respondent to Gregory X's call for briefs, William of Tripoli, reported that the
indigenous Christians disapproved of the crusades as an impediment to good
business. 44 In short, while war against unbelievers was in theory supportable,
the facts argued against it. For Thomas, judgment and action always take place
in specific contexts and if all the conditions for right action are not met, the act is
defective. 45
Thomas's three conditions for jus ad bellum (justice in going to war) lie at the
heart of subsequent just war thinking. The remaining ad bellum criteria - proportionality of war to injury, last resort, and reasonable hope of success- are simply
demands of prudence. Anyone who would undertake war in the absence of such
conditions would by that very fact convict himself of malicious belligerence. But
it remains to consider the restraints that must be observed in prosecuting a
war, what came to be called the jus in bello criteria for maintaining a just war. Here
again it is important to recall that all the conditions must be met for a war to be
just and defect at any point renders the enterprise blameworthy. So in considering
whether subterfuge and ambush are legitimate tactics in war, Thomas notes that
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there is a distinction between lying or promise-breaking and concealment. The
first sort of deception requires the deliberate use of wicked means and is never
acceptable. Concealment, on the other hand, is a legitimate dictate of prudence.
Wicked means may never be used in any circumstances. This includes targeting
the innocent to achieve a military objective. Thomas makes a clear distinction
between private and public persons in noting that "if a private person uses the sword
by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or if a public person uses it through zeal
for justice ... then he himself does not 'draw the sword', but is commissioned by
another to use it, and does not deserve punishment. " 46 The logic of the argument is
clear. A sovereign is commissioned by the people to pursue and protect the common
good. Those in authority may, in tum, commission previously private individuals
to use deadly force on behalf of the public. By being incorporated into a public
instrument private persons become part of a whole. So when the soldier attacks
another soldier, he acts legitimately and the killing is not malicious. This is true
even if the jus ad bellum criteria are not met; it does not lie within the authority
of the individual soldier to determine whether or not there is just cause, right intent,
and the like. Unless an order or tactic is manifestly unjust the soldier may, in good
conscience, follow orders. The defect in the action falls on the head of the commanderY Soldiers, then, can only kill other soldiers. The army is the instrument
with which the aggressor inflicts his injury and the instrument by which the aggression is repulsed. In later work this will come to be known as the in bello criterion
of"discrimination," which condemns any attack on non-combatants.
Of course, it would be absurd to pretend that wars take place without civilian
casualties, even in the more restricted context of medieval warfare. In his discussion
of self-defense Thomas elaborates what comes to be called the principle of"double
effect." This much misinterpreted principle is not intended by Aquinas as the
introduction of some arcane, much less arbitrary, theoretical justification for doing
evil. He is, rather, making explicit something that is generally taken for granted
when we assign responsibility. "A single act," he writes, "may have two effects,
of which one alone is intended, whilst the other is incidental to that intention."48
Consider, for example, any competition for an academic position. One graduate
student may know that a friend is competing for the same job, but as long as she
behaves honestly and in good faith, she deserves no blame if she succeeds. By
extension, when the private person resists his attacker with reasonable force there
is no malice, even if the attacker dies._
Soldiers using otherwise legitimate means, particularly in modem warfare
(though even medieval archers often missed the mark), should realize that noncombatants in proximity to the fighting run a risk of injury. Therefore they must use
their weapons in ways that discriminate between legitimate objects: combatants,
their weapons, and the materials that make aggression possible. When soldiers fire
at legitimate targets, with reasonable weapons, and hit civilian bystanders, it is
tragic but not culpable. 49 1t is no counter-argument that what is reasonable is often
a matter of judgment. We exercise the virtues of prudence, justice, and courage to
determine where to draw the line. Thomas's Aristotelianism is not designed
9
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to eliminate judgment but to clarifY it. Nor is it relevant that people lie or dissemble
about their real intentions. The fact remains, if known only to God.
Aquinas was on his way to attend Gregory's council at Lyons when he died, in
March of 1274. He had apparently intended to address the issue of Latin-Greek
relations, since he was travelling with a copy ofhisAgainst the Errors ofthe Greeks,
composed a decade earlier. There is no way to be sure what he might have said on
Gregory's proposed crusade. But his account of the ethics ofwar rapidly became
the benchmark discussion. No previous author so fully integrated the problem
of war into a comprehensive moral psychology and political theory. Virtuous
people make reasonable laws to facilitate the business of the commonwealth. All
are essential, but first among equals is virtue, which is essential to making good laws
and pursuing the right sort ofbusiness. The account provided by Aquinas remained
the standard for the next 300 years. 50

From the death of Aquinas to the Second Scholastic
The most notable event in the subsequent century was the appearance of the first
independent legal treatise on war, that of John ofLegnano, who taught both civil
and canon law at the University ofBologna from the 1350s until his death in 1383,51
While students oflaw had addressed issues of war from Gratian on, the discussions
are generally jumbled and philosophically unstructured. Thomas Aquinas was
particularly dismissive of the authority of lawyers. But the concerns of lawyers
are of necessity the concerns of the society and a look at John of Legnano is an
entry into a new vocabulary emerging in the later Middle Ages. The first thing to
remark is the very wide scope John gives to the concept of war. There is, to begin,
a distinction between spiritual and corporeal war. Spiritual war at the celestial level
seems to be the struggle of the individual against the limit placed and judgment
passed on human life by God. At the human level, spiritual war reflects the Pauline
struggle between the law of God and the law operative in the body. 52 Corporeal
war comprises not only what Thomas means by war- which John calls "universal
corporeal war"- but the conflicts of individuals that result in reprisals and duels.
Though John cites Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas in those chapters where he
talks about virtue, courage, and justice in general, questions oflegal authority and
obedience dominate the work. Following the discussion of mercenaries, for
example, is the question "whether those who die in war are saved?"53 The answer
is that those who die in war for the Church are saved, while those who die in another
sort of lawful war are saved only on condition that they are without mortal sin.
"But if they fall in an unlawful war," he insists, "though that be their only mortal
sin, they perish." Thus to have a legal obligation to a lord may be morally binding,
on pain of loss of livelihood, while to venture forth, if the war is unlawful, may
jeopardize eternal life. The disparate legal judgments, from differing times and
places, often leave it unclear how to resolve whether or not an action is lawful
and who is bound by it, morally or legally. So when John asks "whether a vassal is
bound to help his lord against his father, or a father against his son?" several texts
10
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seem to say that the feudal oath takes precedent while another gloss "somewhat
inclines to the contrary view." John concludes, not very helpfully, that "I should
think that the quality of the assistance to be rendered should be considered."54
For Thomas, human law should be in the service of the common good, pursued
in accord with the virtues. Any obligation must be analyzed in the context ofjustice
and the common good. What the son owes to the father in virtue of his gift of life,
nurture, and stewardship can never, for Aquinas, following Aristotle, be repaid.
It is only if the father were to become vicious and inimical to the common good that
the son could ever be required to take sides against him and then only if the son
had a public role like that of a policeman. This should not be taken to imply that all
issues can be resolved independent of the law. Any extended human community
will require some body of law to negotiate day-to-day existence and some judicial
body to consider findings of fact in the light of that law. The point is only that
the law does not float free of the community's pursuit of the common good. When
justice seems to be at odds with the letter of the law, the virtuous judge exercises
equity to maintain our collective commitment to justice and the common good. 5 5
Contrast this with John's account of dueling. On his usage the duel is a "particular
war," specifically "a corporeal fight between two persons, deliberate on both sides,
designed for compurgation, glory, or exaggeration ofhatred."56 All such endeavors
would clearly violate Thomas's rejection of brawling and private killing. Even
the duel of compurgation, by which John means the lex duellorum, a duel to vindicate one's position before a court oflaw, is explicitly ruled out. For while it may
take place as a public proceeding under the rules of a court of law, it is a form of
divination and improperly involves demanding a judgment from God. 57 Thus the
fact that the Lombard law permited such duels in 20 cases is inconsequential and
John's discussion of champions, the organization of the duel, and who should strike
first (cf. chaps. 176-194), for instance, are of merely antiquarian interest. 58
The rise of the lawyers did not signal the end of theological treatment of war.
In the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Thomas is not the only
theological authority invoked in discussing war. In the Question at Vespers of 1512,
Jacques Almain writes rather baldly that "Scotus's assertion in question 3 of
distinction 15 [of his commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences] is quite false,
that it is not legitimate for anyone whatever to kill by public authority other than
in the cases excepted by God from the commandment 'Thou shalt not kill.' " 59
The implication is that, at least for the _purposes of disputation, there is a tradition
of invoking John Duns Scotus against the just war arguments of Aquinas. In his
discussion of the Decalogue, Scotus argues that the sixth commandment, along
with the rest of the second tablet, is not properly speaking part of the natural law.
From this it would seem to follow that once the commandment is issued it must be
understood as direct divine legislation, which remains binding unless and until there
is a dispensation issued by God. The implication is that this extends to all killing,
including wars of self-defense and the execution of criminals. 60
Against this Almain invokes Aquinas explicitly for the legitimacy of excising the
diseased part and thus, by analogy, for the praiseworthiness ofkilling the dangerous
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criminal. Furthermore, the community acts in accord with practical reason when it
delegates this authority to the prince, who acts to protect the common good. Almain
insists that, while the delegation of authority is positive, Thomas is right to say
that it is natural for human beings to form communities and that it accords with
practical reason to create things like police forces and armies. Since these various
forces are ordered to a specific, communal end, they await no direct command, even
that of God, for their reasonable use.
The pre-eminence of St. Thomas in moral theology was an explicit tenet of the
movement known as the "Second Scholastic" and associated with a group of
Parisian trained Spanish Dominicans a bit younger than Almain. The best known
are Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto. Vitoria and Soto were both active
critics of Spanish practice and policy in the recently discovered New World. It
is, in fact, for his Inquiry on the Indians that Vitoria remains the most widely known
and widely read figure of the Second Scholastic. Following Thomas, Vitoria begins
by noting that there is some doubt as to the propriety of Spanish conduct in the
newly discovered lands and that in such cases neither the royal counsellors nor
lawyers are competent to judge a case which rightly falls to the moral theologian. 61
Vitoria reviews the possible titles that Spain might have to dominion in the New
World and finds them wanting, concluding that, in the main, Spanish treatment
of the New World natives has been illicit and immoral. Neither the king nor the
pope is a universal sovereign. Given the existence of recognizable indigenous communities, the representatives of the king had no authority to intervene in their
lives or appropriate their properties. Adventurers such as the brothers Pizarro, whose
depredations were manifestly vicious, should be strongly sanctioned by the king
and his ministers and Vitoria even suggested, though only in oblique terms, that
reparations might be in order. 62
Vitoria follows Thomas in insisting that, while the Spaniards have in principle
a right to preach the Gospel, and that the natives incur mortal sin in failing to
believe, this sin is wholly intelligible given the context and does not license any
war by the Spaniards. If they must resort to arms in self-defense, that force should
extend only to their protection and if they succeed in suppressing an attack they
are still not allowed to carry war to the natives. Nor is it just to despoil them or to
place them in servitude, even were the intent to make them more receptive to the
Gospel. There is no justice in conversion by the sword. 63
In the 1540s the humanist and royal chronicler Juan Gines de Sepulveda invoked
the Aristotelian doctrine of "natural slavery" to claim that the Spanish conquests
were just. Sepulveda argued that the native Americans lived a life so crude and
lacking in the basic amenities of civilization that it was an act of Aristotelian justice
and Christian charity to subdue them to a higher civilizing force. The Dominican
Bartolome de Las Casas, who had long been active in the native cause, objected
strenuously and succeeded in having Sepulveda's book suppressed in Spain. Soto,
who convened the conference on publishing the volume, summarized the competing
arguments and shortly thereafter, in his work on justice, not only reiterated the
position of Vitoria, but pointed out that even the least sophisticated among
12
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the Indians was no more a natural slave than the peasants and simple-minded of
Spain itself, whom nobody thought could rightfully be enslaved. 64 In their
discussions of Spanish injustice in the New World, Vitoria and Soto displayed the
practical applicability ofjust war thinking as formulated by Thomas Aquinas. While
recognizing the importance oflegal issues, those findings were clearly subordinate
to those of moral theology.

The triumph of the lawyers
The legal and moral traditions proceeded in parallel for the next 250 years, but more
and more the just war tradition of Aquinas and the Second Scholastic came to be
identified with Catholic Orthodoxy and to be replaced, when questions of justice
came up at all, by the legal paradigm as developed by the Dutch humanist Hugo
Grotius. Grotius dutifully acknowledges the work of Aquinas and Vitoria, but it is
a mistake to locate his work in their tradition. First, he reflects the anti-Aristotelian
tum of the humanist tradition. Grotius's anti-Aristotelian program comes out clearly
in The Law of War and Peace, which first appeared in 1625. 65 There he writes
that Aristotle's supremacy in the intellectual world has been so tyrannical "that
Truth, to whom Aristotle devoted faithful service, was by no instrumentality more
repressed than by Aristotle's name!" 66 The source of his anti-Aristotelianism is
not altogether clear, but the result is the traditional lawyerly goal of reducing
the exercise of prudence and equity in favor of a strict deduction of application
from law. By eliminating the Aristotelian appeal to the virtues it is much easier
to put forward "the humanist tradition, which applauded warfare in the interests
of one's respublica, and saw a dramatic moral difference between Christian,
European civilization and barbarism."67
Grotius's earlier volume, De Jure Praedae, shows him doing something quite
new when compared to Vitoria. He combines the Stoic account of human nature
with a lawyerly desire to see ethics in terms of a hierarchy of laws, rules, and
principles governing the exchange of goods in an orderly social machine. From the
Stoics Grotius takes the notion that God's will is the law and that it is expressed
in the design of creation. Central to all animals, including humans, is the urge to
self-preservation. Humans are also endowed with reason and an inclination to
sociability. "We are born," he writes, "for a life offellowship."68 So we are impelled
by nature toward the creation of a social order. At the same time, nature demands
that we take whatever means are necessary to maintain our security. The result
is that we contract with our fellows to establish a system oflaws and the instruments
for their enforcement. Grotius elaborates a legal structure of nine rules and 13 laws
from which, he maintains, various theses and their corollaries may be shown to
follow. 69
Specifically, Grotius hopes to justify the recent Dutch seizure of a Portuguese
vessel. Because evil deeds must be corrected, the good pursued, and the care of
the common good maintained by all citizens, "a private war is undertaken justly in
so far as judicial recourse is lacking." 70 Because the Spanish have, for a sustained
13

G. SCOTT DAVIS

period of time, injured the interests of the Dutch generally and because the Spanish
cannot be brought to cease from their abuses, it is legitimate that prizes should be
taken when possible.71 Thus, this particular prize is legitimate and the Dutch should
"defend the right of commerce against every possible injury." 72
Turning, in his Law of War and Peace, to the indigenous peoples of the nonChristian world, Grotius rejects the arguments ofVitoria and Soto:
Regarding such barbarians, wild beasts rather than men, one may rightly
say what Aristotle wrongly said of the Persians ... that war against them
was sanctioned by nature; and what !socrates said, in his Panathenaic
Oration, that the most just war is against savage beasts, the next against
men who are like beasts.
(1925: II, 40)
This is doubly appropriate when such barbarians violate the natural law, for "they
[Vitoria et al.] claim that the power of punishing is the proper effect of civil
jurisdiction while we hold that it also is derived from the law ofnature. 73 Grotius
may use the language ofAquinas and his Spanish followers, but it is a language that
has become vastly more permissive than the older school. And it paves the way
for supposedly liberal thinkers such as John Stuart Mill to write as if it were obvious that Africans, Indians east or west, and similarly barbaric peoples must fall
under western tutelage before they can enjoy the benefits of liberty. Thus Mill,
writing two and a half centuries after Grotius, can take it as "hardly necessary
to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of
their faculties ... Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with
barbarians."74
The consolidation of the Westphalian system, the expansions of colonial empire,
the age of revolution, and the struggle to maintain the balance of power in the
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries left the classic just war tradition
in the dust. Questions oflaw and contract, on the one hand, and liberty and nationalism, on the other, dominate arguments of rhetoric of the late eighteenth and the
nineteenth centuries. Serious political thinkers, such as the young Henry Kissinger,
take as their ideal the practical political machinators of the post-Napoleonic
era. Kissinger's A World Restored, based on his 1954 Harvard dissertation, maintains that "the test of a statesman, then, is his ability to recognize the real relationship
of forces and to make this knowledge serve his ends." 75 The realism of Kissinger,
in the history of political thought, is the flip side of John Dewey's idealism.

War and justice in twentieth-century thought
In the first half of the twentieth century the natural law approach to the ethics of
war was dismissed by most American political thinkers. "During the nineteenth
century," writes John Dewey, "the notion of natural law in morals fell largely
into discredit and disuse outside the orthodox moralists of the Catholic church ...
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Even when retained, as in some texts, it was in perfunctory deference to tradition
rather than as a living intellectual force." 76
The alternative to natural law occupied Dewey for much of his career, particularly
after the start of the First World War. His German Philosophy and Politics of1915
is not generally thought one of his most compelling volumes. Nonetheless, Jo
Ann Boydston writes that, "although in later years this book has been generally
conceded to be among Dewey's least valuable, reviewers praised it at the time of
its publication.'m
One who did not, however, was W. E. Hocking. Dewey, as Hocking rightly reads
him, sees a direct connection between Kant's categorical imperative and German
militarism. "Can anyone with the slightest historical justice," asks Hocking
rhetorically, "credit the German government of to-day with following this
Kantian principle?" Hocking closes with the accusation that German behavior is,
in fact, "pragmatic, which is what Realpolitik essentially means." 78 Dewey, rather
obviously irked, responds that "Professor Hocking has not grasped my position." 79
German Philosophy and Politics, while inspired by the European conflict, is a casestudy in moral theory, designed to articulate Dewey's sense "that there are no
such things as pure ideas of pure reason." 80 Ideas are themselves expressions of
living individuals and communities coming to grips with a concrete situation. When
the social world is orderly it is not necessary, nor are people ordinarily inclined,
to reflect in depth on the norms and ideals embodied in social life. In times of
flux, however, ordinarily stable beliefs and inferences fall into question. War, thus,
opens a window on the relation between ideas and action.
Alan Ryan, a sympathetic reader of German Philosophy and Politics, describes
it as "one of the most striking (though not strikingly persuasive) books Dewey
ever wrote," 81 and attributes the failure of the argument, at least in part, to the fact
that Dewey "relied rather too heavily" on the German military theorist Friedrich
von Bemhardi. 82 But this, I think, misses Dewey's point. At the tum of the century
Bemhardi was in charge of war history for the German General Staff. By 1909 he
was commanding general of the Seventh Army. His On War Today (of which
Germany and the Next War is volume two) has been described by Michael Howard
as "brilliant and heterodox," containing "a great deal of shrewd tactical analysis." 83
The text went through nine editions in the two years before the war and shortly
after the opening of hostilities the young Walter Lippmann, later to assist in
formulating Wilson's "fourteen points,"_wrote that "we were all surprised at the war,
stunned at the idea that such things could happen. And then we took to reading
Bemhardi ... and we discovered that this war had been a long time in the minds
of the men who know Europe."84 Whatever the actual motives of individual agents
in the field, Bemhardi is a Weberian "ideal type," playing the role of Benjamin
Franklin in Dewey's account of the Kantian ethic and the spirit of militarism.
Dewey argues that interpreting morality on the model of law, whether it be
that of the philosopher-king, the Christian god, or the rational intellect, risks turning
the strategies of a particular time and place into superhumanly established and
maintained norms. When this illusion becomes the norm it stifles our ability to
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innovate and experiment with alternative approaches. As in Weber's account of
the spirit of capitalism, an all-encompassing idea- here Kant's cosmopolitan vision
of perpetual peace- is transformed into its opposite. War, now, "is to national life
what the winds are to the sea, 'preserving mankind from the corruption engendered
by immobility.' " 85
Against "a priorism" Dewey advocates "a radically experimental philosophy," 86
but he denies the European identification of "Americanism" with "a crude empiricism and a materialistic utilitarianism."87 1t is closer, surprisingly, to the position
of Burke. What inspires Dewey to identify with Burke is the conservative icon's
rejection of"metaphysical abstraction" and his insistence on grounding the moral
life in the contingencies of shared experience. What distinguishes American liberalism from British conservatism is the fact that "America is too new ... we have not
the requisite background of law, institutions and achieved social organization."88
Not only that, "but in our internal constitution we are actually interracial and
international."89 Only with violent internal upheaval could we attain the sort of
cultural and historical homogeneity that renders Burke's conservatism plausible.
The moral life of democracy is one that fosters "the fruitful processes of cooperation in the great experiment ofliving together ... a future in which freedom
and fullness of human companionship is the aim, and intelligent cooperative
experimentation is the method."90 Only in the service of these democratic ideals
is it legitimate to break the peace; only in furtherance of these ideals, Dewey
ultimately wants to say, can a democratic community enter into the present war. His
willingness to support the war effort was always predicated on this democratic jus
ad bellum and he was deeply disappointed with the outcome of the war. Dewey's
stance against the League of Nations and his involvement with the "outlawry
of war" movement reflect this disappointment. 91 Philosophically, however, it was
a descent into nonsense. Dewey writes that:
The Committee for the Outlawry of War had strenuously opposed making
a distinction between aggressive and defensive wars, point out that
all nations claimed that their own wars were defensive and holding to the
idea that it was the institution of war and not particular wars which were
to be outlawed. 92
At the time he vilified international law as implicated in the "war system. " 93 Having
rejected the just war tradition, Dewey, America's leading public intellectual in the
first half of the twentieth century, leaves us with a stark contrast between pacifism
and an aggressive Euro-American will to power.
Almost a decade later, Dewey reverted to the position he held prior to his outlawry
of war period. "War with a totalitarian power," he insists, "is war against an
aggressive way of life that can maintain itself in existence only by constant
extension of its sphere of aggression. " 94 This totalitarian challenge is a direct attack
on the virtues of democracy. While not to be welcomed, much less sought out, this
sort of war is part of our democratic commitment "to unceasing effort to break
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down the walls of class, of unequal opportunity, of color, race, sect, and nationality,
which estranges human beings from one another."95 When confronted with war the
pragmatist swings between democratic, then pacifist, then back to democratic
idealism.

Ethics and war in a nuclear age: the return
of the just war tradition
If ever a day changed everything, it was 6 August 1945. "Little Boy" and "Fat
Man" were astounding in their economy and their aftermath; but for the Japanese,
the terror had already become routine. The dropping of the atomic bomb was the
culmination of six months of firebombing:
The most careful count, done by the Japanese themselves, produced fewer
losses than the Americans estimated, but either number is horrific: 240,000
to 300,000 dead (mostly civilians), approximately 2.5 million homes
destroyed, and more than 8 million refugees. Of71 Japanese cities, only
5 escaped substantial damage - and two of these were Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. 96
The firebombing of Japan brought to the Pacific theater tactics that had already
been roundly condemned in the European. In the Catholic world, the American
Jesuit John Ford had condemned the firebombing of Germany along lines that
continued the analysis of Aquinas and the Second Scholastic. "No proportionate
cause," Ford concluded, "could justify the evil done; and to make it legitimate
would soon lead the world to the immoral barbarity of total war."97 A few years
later, the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe protested giving an Oxford
honorary to Harry Truman on the grounds that he was a mass murderer. 98 In 1961,
Anscombe joined with a distinguished group of British Catholics to train the
resources of just war thinking on the emerging policy of deterrence by mutually
assured destruction. 99
In the United States, Catholic moral thought was viewed with suspicion by the
mostly Protestant mainstream and Dewey's invocation of democratic values hardly
seemed adequate to deal with the situation. So, at least, it seemed to Paul Ramsey.
In 1961, he shocked the Protestant establishment by turning away from the
pragmatic realism of Reinhold Niebuhr and embracing, with some modifications,
the tradition of Vitoria(J~.amsey recast the just war theory in an Augustinian
mold, insisting on the centrality of agape, the other regarding love that demands of
public officials a commitment to the welfare of their neighbors, even if it requires
the exercise of deadly force. On this version, Aquinas's Aristotelian moral
psychology is relegated to the background and the just war tradition after Augustine
becomes a matter of clarifying the principles that inform Christian love of
neighbor. 100
As opposition to the war in Vietnam gathered momentum, Ramsey and the just
war tradition generally came to be seen as tools of the right wing establishment. In
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1977, Michael Walzer published his own reworking of the just war tradition, pitched
to the social democratic left. Walzer was reacting to his own sense that the anti-war
movement of the mid-1960s did not have an adequate vocabulary to explain what
was wrong with the war in Vietnam and what was right about nuclear deterrence.
Like Ramsey, Walzer had little use for the Aristotelian background of Aquinas
and the Second Scholastic, identifying himself with a legal paradigm grounded
in the contractarian tradition of Grotius, Hobbes, and Rousseau. For Walzer, the
''war convention" stipulates the intuitive ideals for fighting a just war, and we then
elaborate the modifications of that convention forced on us by the necessities
of war, culminating in "supreme emergency," which licenses illegal acts in order
to protect our basic values, but only so long as is necessary to put down the threat
and restore the rule oflaw.
However interpreted, the just war criteria have become the starting points, on the
left and right, for discussing the ethics of war. Advocates and critics of the American
actions in the first Gulf War agreed that the jus ad bellum requires:

2
3
4
5
6

right authority
just cause
right intention
last resort
reasonable hope of success
proportionality of injury to the consequences ofwar. 101

Both sides also insisted that the just prosecution of a war satisfy the jus in bello
demands of:

2

discrimination, subject to the reasonable allowance of double effect
proportion, in the sense of limiting damage to the importance of a particular
action for securing the ends of war.

These are the minimal conditions for justice. Players on the international stage
are always at liberty to hold themselves to a higher standard through signing on to
international treaties and joining international organizations, but such alliances are
conditional. For just war thinkers, the demands ofjustice are not.

Ethics, war, and the perils of comparison
The twenty-first-century promises to be more multi-cultural than any since
the advent of modernity, with the voices and vocabularies of many traditions
demanding to be heard. How these alternative voices shape the thought and practice
of the next few decades defies prediction, but making a start on grasping those
vocabularies should not be postponed. Based solely on the history of the western
just war tradition, the student of comparative ethics ought to recognize that there
are at least three models, broadly speaking, for understanding ethics: the legal
paradigm; the virtue, or character, paradigm; and the economic paradigm.
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The legal paradigm finds it natural to speak oflaw, a lawgiver, and a community
bound to observe the law. In the western tradition, the oldest continuous version of
this model is that found in Hebrew Scripture. The creator issues commands, first
to Adam and Eve, later to Noah and Abraham, and finally to Moses. God has the
authority to issue these laws because, as creator, he is ultimately the owner of his
creation. Despite the clear demands of his law, humans continually fail to observe
them, which typically leads to some sanction. Thus Adam and Eve are expelled
from the Garden, all but Noah and his family are expunged from creation, Abraham
is tested and found worthy, and the people oflsrael, despite their apostasy at Sinai,
receive the 613 commandments of Torah.
The best critic of ethics as law is Aristotle himself. The Nicomachean Ethics sees
law as a product of individual societies, seeking to formulate a code of public
behavior, such as the constitution of Athens, that facilitates the pursuit of what
the community cares about. Such constitutions presuppose at least a rudimentary
consensus about the kind of people valued, the kind ofbehavior to be praised and
blamed, and the sort of polis that should be fostered. For such communities there
is no need to ask about universal reason; what matters is the shared reasons they
give each other either for applauding or condemning what goes on among them. The
character and virtues of both the individuals and the group as a whole are what
give the law meaning.
The "economic paradigm" treats ethics along the lines ofcontracts and exchanges.
We have seen in Grotius that individuals find themselves under the law, but only
as a result of an implicit agreement motivated by nature. What the law must acknowledge are the rights, as well as the duties, secured in the initial contract. John Rawls,
the most important recent contract theorist, argues that to achieve fairness the
contract must be negotiated, conceptually speaking, from an original position
where the parties do not know where they will end up in the social order. Once the
basic structure of justice is in place, goods are negotiated in the public square
on the basis offairness. 102 When it comes to war, Rawls simply identifies himself
with the contractarian approach ofWalzer. 103
While Rawls proposes his theory of justice as an alternative to utilitarianism,
utilitarians such as Peter Singer agree that:
an ethical principle cannot be justified in relation to any partial or sectional
group ... Ethics requires us to go beyond 'I' and 'you' to the universal
law, the universalisable judgment, the standpoint ofthe impartial spectator
or ideal observer, or whatever we choose to call it. 104
What leads Singer to utilitarianism is the sense that Rawls does not provide credible
guidance in justifying the ways we balance competing interests to satisfy our
intuitions about what is best. Utilitarianism, despite its critics, at least gives some
direction to what counts as the best consequences. Ultimately, right action is a
matter of balancing aggregate goods over individual evils. When we want to draw
a line, it becomes, as for Rawls, a matter of negotiating where the attempt to
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maximize goods must be limited. So, while Singer follows Seneca in seeing
infanticide as the compassionate solution to "the problem posed by sick and
deformed babies," he hastens to add that "killing an infant whose parents do not
want it dead is, of course, an utterly different matter." 105
It would be a mistake to think that comparative ethics is simply a matter of
attaching these labels to this or that author in this or that tradition. Most traditions
will display features of all three. Classical Judaism, for example, might be thought
of as standing foursquare in the legal paradigm, but it is hardly to be divorced from
the prophetic tradition, calling Israel to be the sort of people God wants them
to be. At the same time, opening the Mishnah at random will likely confirm the
importance of rights and fairness in the exercise of the law. For example, at
Sanhedrin 3.1: "Cases concerning property are decided by three judges. Each suitor
chooses one and together they choose another. So R. Meir. But the Sages say: The
two judges choose yet another." 106 If there is already this mix of paradigms in
the foundational text of classical Judaism, we should hardly be surprised if its
contemporary branches divide up with even greater complexity. No theory or
method can get around the fact that human acts are always performed in a particular
time and place and that interpreting those acts requires some entry into language
and context.
At the most general level, interpretation is a matter of what Donald Davidson
calls "triangulation." Imagine two individuals who do not as yet share a language
encountering each other on the seashore. They may respond to each other in many
different ways, putting both in possession of three bits of information: his own
response, the response of the other, and the environment that provokes the response.
Assuming they have the time and inclination, the two can, by a familiar process of
backing and forthing, move closer to getting the responses to match up. By itself,
this sort of triangulation may not be sufficient to identify precisely what the other
thinks, wants, feels or believes, but it "is necessary if there is to be any answer
at all to the question what its concepts are concepts of." 107 Once their responses are
regularly predictable they can undertake cooperative actions together. After that,
it's a gray line where we say the one has learned the other's language.
Still, as Wittgenstein put it, "one human being can be a complete enigma to
another." But this doesn't refer to some sort of Cartesian privacy. Rather:
We learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange
traditions; and, what is more, even given a mastery of the country's
language. We do not understand the people. (And not because of not
knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet
with them. 108
The source of the problem is not one of radical translation. It lies in the "entirely
strange traditions." R. C. Zaehner, for example, was a prodigious linguist, but he
never seems to have felt at home with the rituals of purity and concern for pollution
evident in the traditions he studied. In his introduction to Zoroastrianism he:
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omits all account of the elaborate system of taboo worked out in the
Videvdat ... and maintained down to the present day by the orthodox.
This I have done because it is of no interest to the general reader and
because it is the least attractive and the least worthwhile aspect of an
otherwise attractive religion. 109
He says similar things about Hinduism in various places. In his sketch of
Hinduism he refers the reader to the Abbe Dubois's Hindu Manners, Customs, and
Ceremonies, first published in English in 1816, "as still the most exhaustive
treatment of a subject scarcely touched on in this book." 110 In this Zaehner is simply
the heir, perhaps odd for a Catholic convert, to a modem "tendency to suppose
that any ritual is empty form." 111 The result is that Zaehner never learns how the
language of pollution, ritual, and sacrifice hang together in the life of his subjects.
As far as day-to-day existence goes, he never finds his feet with them. 112
Herbert Fingarette's Confucius: The Secular as Sacred transformed the study
of Confucianism, and comparative religious ethics, by reading the Analects not
as the "archaic irrelevance" of a "prosaic and parochial moralizer," 113 but as the
work of a social visionary trying to articulate a way to see Lu and its neighboring
principalities as a cultural whole, worthy of preservation in a period of warring
states and social turmoil. Of the three ways, generally speaking, that individuals
can be brought to cooperate, two- coercion and contract- are inherently unstable.
By seeing the practices that secure order as "an inheritance through accepted
tradition," 114 Confucius succeeded in persuading subsequent generations that
"the dignity peculiar to man and the power associated with this dignity could be
characterized in terms of holy rite." 115
Fingarette articulates the interrelated vocabulary of ceremony -li,jen, shu, etc.
- as an alternative to the ethics of law and guilt, or that of utility and contract,
prevalent in Anglo-American moral theory. While he is committed to the practices,
and some of the positions, of the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, 116
Fingarette is profoundly dissatisfied with moral theory done in the:
language of choice and responsibility as these are intimately intertwined
with the idea ofthe ontologically ultimate power of the individual to select
from genuine alternatives to create his own spiritual destiny, and with the
related ideas of spiritual guilt, 51nd repentance or retribution for such
guilt." 7
Whether they used a language like ours or not, the people of ancient China
faced problems not wholly unlike their contemporaries to the west. "Some men,"
Fingarette remarks, "were more responsible than others in Confucius's day as in
ours. It is also obvious that men made choices in ancient China." 118 The point
is to see how other people thought about their lives and to see what light that
sheds on our ways of thinking about our lives. His Confucius sees "the flowering
of humanity in the ceremonial acts ofmen." 119 This is, if you like, a Chinese ethic
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of character, for whose adherents it is both a duty and an honor to become the
sort of person who wants to continue the way of the ancestors. This sort of person
needs no fear of human or superhuman sanction or reward to do what needs to be
done. 120
Fingarette's engaged, sympathetic rereading is only the first step in finding our
feet in comparative ethics. In the last century the flowering of social anthropology
made it progressively easier to grasp how what might seem entirely alien to the
foreign visitor could be second nature to the locals. Ethnographic classics by E. E.
Evans-Pritchard, Godfrey Lienhardt, and others allowed the sympathetic reader
to feel, if not exactly at home, an honored guest in some very alien environments. 121
But Mary Douglas may have done more than anyone to shake the modem
psychologism that makes it easy to think other cultures are undeveloped versions
of our own. 122
By using her fieldwork among the Lele of the Kasai to generate an alternative
reading of the abominations of Leviticus she highlighted the importance of social
norms and categories in shaping perception. 123 She made it impossible to read
cavalier dismissals of ritual practice like those of Zaehner as anything other than
the product ofblinkered parochialism. Later works trained the anthropological lens
on our own classificatory practices, suggesting that what appear to us to be natural
and unreflective responses to our environs are themselves products of the languages
and habits we're trained into from birth. 124
At the same time Douglas was developing a nuanced, fieldwork savvy version
of Durkheim, Clifford Geertz was doing much the same for Max Weber. In his
early essays, Geertz saw himself as working on "a kind of prototheory ... of a more
adequate analytic framework. " 125 By 1967, he had begun to worry less about social
theory and more about constructing perspicuous narratives that brought out
the workings of the different societies he observed. In his Terry Lectures, Geertz
"attempted to lay out a general framework for the comparative analysis of religion
and to apply it to a study of the development of a supposedly single creed." 126
While not averse to the Durkheimian approach ofDouglas, 127 Geertz sees Weber
as providing a more subtle entry into the complications introduced by· change
over time. To take the most famous of Weber's case studies, the Reformed
asceticism of Calvin's Geneva was embraced as an ideal by followers in Holland,
Scotland, and England. That asceticism was popularized in English by Bunyan's
Pilgrim's Progress, which Weber describes as "by far the most widely read book
of the whole Puritan literature." 128
In less than a hundred years, Benjamin Franklin, the son of one of Bunyan's
Puritan contemporaries, would be perpetrating hoaxes, counselling revolutionaries,
and giving canonical expression to an American ethic of capitalist thrift. Nothing,
it would seem, could be further from the ethos of Pilgrim's Progress than Franklin's
utilitarian deism. Yet, Weber argues, the ideas of Calvin and Bunyan held within
themselves the seeds of "present-day capitalism ... into which the individual is
born, and which presents itself to him, at least as an individual, as an unalterable
order of things in which he must live." 129 Regardless of its adequacy as history,
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what impresses Geertz is Weber's ability to link ideas to social change, which then
produces new ideas. Because human beings are constantly attempting to figure out
what's going on around them, ideas are constantly being interpreted, invented, and
rearranged in response to the "problem ofmeaning." 130
The 1970s found Geertz hoping "to draw large conclusions from small, but
very densely textured facts; to support broad assertions about the role of culture
in the construction of collective life by engaging them exactly with complex
specifics." 131 By the time Geertz delivered the Storrs Lectures in 1981, his quick
term for these complex specifics had become "local knowledge." "Law," he writes,
"is local knowledge; local not just as to place, time, class, and variety of issue,
but as to accent- vernacular characterizations of what happens connected to vernacular imaginings of what can." 132 Learning the language of legal judgment is
as much a matter of triangulation as it is for the language of perception. Any theory
oflaw, if meant to account for how people in different times and places go about
enforcing their demands on each other and solve, or resolve, matters in dispute,
would have to be so general as to be of very little descriptive use. Those trained
up in one or more ofthe schools oflslamic law, Shari'a, may have serious doubts
about the procedures of someone trained up in Indic law, with "its animating
idea, dharma." 133 Both could easily be flumoxed by people discussing adat, a word
of Arabic origins, meaning something like "custom," in an unnamed Balinese
village in 1958. 134
Geertz tells the story of Regreg and his lost wife to put on display the ways
that wrinkles in one system cannot easily be ironed out by another. Regreg's kingroup was too weak to force his wife's abductor/boyfriend to return her. When he
bucked the system of adat, apparently in a fit of peek, Regreg was shunned, left
to wander "homeless, about the streets and courtyards of the village like a ghost,
or more exactly like a dog." 135 When "the highest ranking traditional king on Bali,
who was also, under the arrangements in effect at the time, the regional head of
the new Republican government, came to beg Regreg's case," 136 the local council
refused to allow Regreg back. The new law was lovely, but not applicable. This
local judgment, Geertz wants to insist, reflects its own "legal sensibility: one with
form, personality, bite, and, even without the aid of law schools, jurisconsults,
restatements, journals, or landmark decisions, a firm, developed, almost willful
awareness ofitself." 137 The moral ofGeertz's effort "to render anomalous things
in not too anomalous words" 138 is that we have no choice but to locate our own
traditions and institutions among the various historically, politically, accidentally
shaped alternatives. To attempt to wish this fact away "in a haze of forceless
generalities and false comforts" is neither particularly scientific or much help in
imagining "principled lives we can practicably lead." 139
For those of us who stay fairly close to home, Geertz can agree with Fingarette
that "precisely because we of the West are so deeply immersed in a world conceived
in just such terms" as those found in the tradition that runs from the Greeks, through
the Christians, to contemporary moral theory, "it is profitable for us to see the world
in quite another way." 140 Geertz's critique of legal, and other, theorists intersects
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Fingarette's critique of Anglo-American moral theorists. When, in the essays that
make up his most recent collection, Geertz describes himself as an "anti antirelativist" it is not because he thinks anything goes, but because "looking into
dragons, not domesticating or abominating them, nor drowning them in vats of
theory, is what anthropology has been all about." 141 Translated into ethics and
politics, this amounts to an argument:
that political theory is not, or anyway ought not to be, intensely generalized
reflection on intensely generalized matters, an imagining of architectures in which no one could live, but should be, rather, an intellectual
engagement, mobile, exact, and realistic, with present problems. 142
This is, in a nutshell, what reflection on the purposes and limits of war has always
been, East and West.
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(Bunyan, John (1965) The Pilgrim's Progress, edited with introduction and notes by
Roger Sharrock, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books: 7).
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